SLLA475 December   2020 TCAN1144-Q1 , TCAN1146-Q1

 

  1. 1TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Functional Safety Manual
  2. 2Trademarks
  3. 3Introduction
  4. 4TCAN114x-Q1 Hardware Component Functional Safety Capability
  5. 5Development Process for Management of Systematic Faults
    1. 5.1 TI New-Product Development Process
  6. 6TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Component Overview
    1. 6.1 Targeted Applications
    2. 6.2 Hardware Component Functional Safety Concept
    3. 6.3 Functional Safety Constraints and Assumptions
  7. 7Description of Hardware Component Parts
    1. 7.1 CAN Transceiver
    2. 7.2 Digital Core
    3. 7.3 EEPROM
    4. 7.4 Power Control IP
      1. 7.4.1 Voltage Monitors
    5. 7.5 Thermal Shut Down
    6. 7.6 Digital Input/Outputs
  8. 8TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Management of Random Faults
    1. 8.1 Fault Reporting
    2. 8.2 Functional Safety Mechanism Categories
    3. 8.3 Description of Functional Safety Mechanisms
      1. 8.3.1 CAN Communication
        1. 8.3.1.1 SM-1: CAN bus fault diagnostic
        2. 8.3.1.2 SM-2: Thermal shutdown; TSD
        3. 8.3.1.3 SM-3: CAN bus short circuit limiter, IOS
        4. 8.3.1.4 SM-4: CAN TXD pin dominant state timeout; tTXD_DTO
        5. 8.3.1.5 SM-17: CAN protocol
      2. 8.3.2 Supply Voltage Rail Monitoring
        1. 8.3.2.1 SM-5: VCC undervoltage; UVCC
        2. 8.3.2.2 SM-6: VSUP supply undervoltage; UVSUP
        3. 8.3.2.3 SM-7: VIO supply undervoltage; UVIO
      3. 8.3.3 SPI/Processor Communication
        1. 8.3.3.1 SM-8: Timout, Window or Q&A watchdog error - Normal mode
        2. 8.3.3.2 SM-9: SPI communication error; SPIERR
        3. 8.3.3.3 SM-10: Scratchpad write/read
        4. 8.3.3.4 SM-11: Sleep Wake Error Timer; tINACTIVE
      4. 8.3.4 Device Internal EEPROM
        1. 8.3.4.1 SM-12: Internal memory CRC; CRC_EEPROM
      5. 8.3.5 Floating Pins
        1. 8.3.5.1 SM-13: SCLK internal pull-up to VIO
        2. 8.3.5.2 SM-14: SDI internal pull-up to VIO
        3. 8.3.5.3 SM-15: nCS internal pull-up to VIO
        4. 8.3.5.4 SM-16: TXD internal pull-up to VIO
          1.        B Revision History

6.3 Functional Safety Constraints and Assumptions

In creating a functional Safety Element out of Context (SEooC) concept and doing the functional safety analysis, TI generates a series of assumptions on system level design, functional safety concept, and requirements. These assumptions (sometimes called Assumptions of Use) are listed below. Additional assumptions about the detailed implementation of safety mechanisms are separately located in Section 8.3.

The device Functional Safety Analysis was done under the following system assumptions:

  • [SA_1] The system integrator shall not exceed the recommended operating conditions in the component data sheet.
  • [SA_2] A typical application is as shown in Figure 6-3

During integration activities these assumptions of use and integration guidelines described for this component shall be considered. Use caution if one of the above functional safety assumptions on this component cannot be met, as some identified gaps may be unresolvable at the system level.